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Recently spherical codes were introduced as potentially more capable ensembles for quantum key
distribution. Here we develop specific key creation protocols for the two qubit-based spherical codes,
the trine and tetrahedron, and analyze them in the context of a suitably-tailored intercept/resend
attack, both in standard form, and a “gentler” version whose back-action on the quantum state is
weaker. When compared to the standard unbiased basis protocols, BB84 and six-state, two distinct
advantages are found. First, they offer improved tolerance of eavesdropping, the trine besting its
counterpart BB84 and the tetrahedron the six-state protocol. Second, the key error rate may be
computed from the sift rate of the protocol itself, removing the need to sacrifice key bits for this
purpose. This simplifies the protocol and improves the overall key rate.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.-a
Heretofore quantum key distribution protocols have of-
ten been constructed using sets of unbiased bases, en-
abling key bit creation whenever the two parties Alice
and Bob happen to send and measure the quantum sys-
tem in the same basis. Alice randomly selects a basis
and a state within that basis to send to Bob, who ran-
domly chooses a basis in which to measure and decodes
the bit according to their pre-established scheme. Should
Bob choose the same basis as Alice, his outcome is per-
fectly correlated with hers. Each of the parties publicly
announces the bases used, and for each instance they
agree, they establish one letter of the key. The use of
more than one basis prevents any would-be eavesdropper
Eve from simply reading the encoded bit without Alice
and Bob noticing. In two dimensions two sets of mutually
unbiased bases exist, forming the BB84 [1] and six-state
protocols [2].
Equiangular spherical codes can be used to construct a
new scheme for key distribution [3]. Two such codes ex-
ist in two dimensions. In the Bloch-sphere representation
we may picture these ensembles as three equally-spaced
coplanar states forming a trine or four equally-spaced
states forming a tetrahedron. Both Alice and Bob re-
place their use of unbiased bases with equiangular spher-
ical codes; by arranging Bob’s code to be the dual of
Alice’s, key creation becomes a process of elimination,
as previously considered by Phoenix, et al. [4]. Each of
Bob’s measurement outcomes is orthogonal to one of Al-
ice’s signals, and thus each outcome excludes one signal.
Alice may then attempt to furnish the remaining infor-
mation by announcing a certain number of signals that
were not sent, a process known as sifting. By symmetry,
Bob can also send the sifting information to Alice, in the
form of outcomes not obtained; this convention will be
followed here. The shared (anti-) correlation between sig-
nal and outcome allows them to remain one step ahead
of an eavesdropper Eve, ensuring that unless she tam-
pers with the quantum signal, she knows nothing of the
created key.
Should Eve tamper with the signal, the disturbance
can be recognized by Alice and Bob in the statistics of
their results. With this they can determine what she
knows about their key, and they may either proceed to
shorten their key string so as to remove Eve’s information
of it, or else discard it entirely and begin anew. Unlike
bases-based protocols, however, here Alice and Bob can
determine the disturbance from the sifting rate directly,
obviating the need to explicitly compare (and waste) por-
tions of the key for this purpose.
The overarching questions in evaluating a key distri-
bution protocol are whether or not it is unconditionally
secure, and if so, what the maximum tolerable error rate
is. If, by granting Eve the ability to do anything con-
sistent with the laws of physics, Alice and Bob can still
share a key, the protocol is said to be unconditionally
secure. This state of affairs persists up to the maximum
tolerable error rate, at which point Alice and Bob must
abandon their key creation efforts. Establishing uncon-
ditional security is complicated and delicate, so here we
restrict attention to more limited attacks, examining the
intercept/resend attack and a “gentler” variant. In these
settings we find that the spherical codes are more tolerant
of noise than their basic counterparts. First, however, we
must consider the protocols for the two spherical codes
in detail.
Unlike the case of unbiased bases, in which Alice’s
choice of signal or Bob’s outcome determines the key
letter, for the trine and tetrahedron it is only the re-
lation between Alice’s signal and Bob’s outcome that de-
termines the bit. In the trine protocol Alice’s choice of
signal narrows Bob’s possible outcomes to the two lying
60 degrees on either side. Each is equally likely, and they
publicly agree beforehand that the one clockwise from Al-
ice’s signal corresponds to 1 and the other 0. Alice hopes
to determine which is the case when Bob announces one
outcome that he did not receive. For any given outcome,
he chooses randomly between the other two and publicly
announces it. Half the time he announces that he did not
2receive the outcome which Alice already knew to be im-
possible. This tells Alice nothing new, and she announces
that the protocol failed. In the other half of cases, Alice
learns Bob’s outcome and announces success.
Upon hearing his message was a success, Bob can de-
termine the signal Alice sent. For any outcome Bob re-
ceives, he immediately knows one signal Alice could not
have sent, and the message that his announcement was
successful indicates to him that she also did not send the
signal orthogonal to his message. Had she sent that sig-
nal, she would have announced failure; thus Bob learns
the identity of Alice’s signal. Each knowing the relative
position of signal and outcome, they can each generate
the same requisite bit. This round of communication is
the analog of sifting in the protocols utilizing unbiased
bases: a follow-up classical communication referencing
the quantum signals with which Alice and Bob establish
the key.
Mathematically, we might consider the protocol as fol-
lows. Alice sends signal j, and Bob necessarily obtains
k = j+1 or k = j+2. He announces that he did not
receive l 6=k. If l= j, Alice announces failure. Otherwise
each party knows the identity of j, k, and l, and they
compute the key bit as (1−ǫjkl)/2. Fig. 1 shows the case
that they agree on a 1.
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FIG. 1: Bloch-sphere representation of the trine-based proto-
col by which Alice and Bob create a secret key bit, shown here
creating a 1. Alice’s three possible signal states are shown in
black and Bob’s measurement outcomes in dotted lines; an-
tipodal points are orthogonal. Without loss of generality we
may assume that Alice sends the state j = 1. The antipo-
dal point is the impossible outcome for Bob; here he obtains
the outcome k = 3. Of the two outcomes he did not get, he
picks one at random and announces this to Alice. Here he
announces the outcome l = 2, and Alice infers the value of k.
Had Bob announced the other outcome, the protocol would
fail, as this tells Alice nothing she does not already know.
Here she announces that she is satisfied with Bob’s message,
and Bob infers the value of j, since Alice’s signal could not
have been l. Now they compute the bit (1−ǫjkl)/2 = 1. The
announcement only reveals l, so the bit is completely secret.
Though Eve may listen to the messages on the classi-
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FIG. 2: Unfolded view of the Bloch-sphere tetrahedron states.
Vertices of triangles correspond to Bob’s outcomes, their cen-
ters Alice’s signals; all three vertices of the large triangle rep-
resent the same point antipodal to its center. Suppose Alice
sends signal j; Bob necessarily receives k 6= j. Here we sup-
pose j = 1 and k = 2. Bob then announces two outcomes
not obtained, here shown as l = 3 and m = 4. Had either
message equaled j, which happens 2/3 of the time, Alice an-
nounces failure. Otherwise, as here, she accepts. Thus Alice
determines k, and Bob finds out j. They compute the bit
(1 + ǫjklm)/2 = 1. The announcement reveals only l and m,
so the bit is secret.
cal channel, she still has no knowledge of the bit value,
for all she knows is one outcome Bob did not receive and
the corresponding antipodal state not sent by Alice. Of
the two remaining equally-likely alternatives, one corre-
sponds to a 0 and the other a 1. Hence the protocol
establishes one fully secret bit half the time, analogous
to the BB84 protocol.
The strategy for the tetrahedron is entirely similar,
except that Bob must now reveal two outcomes not ob-
tained. As depicted in Fig. 2, Alice uses four tetrahedral
states in the Bloch-sphere picture, and as before Bob uses
the dual of Alice’s tetrahedron for measurement. Alice
sends signal j and Bob receives k 6=j. He then randomly
chooses two outcomes l and m he did not obtain and an-
nounces them. One-third of the time this is successful, in
that l 6=j and m 6=j. This allows Alice to infer k, and her
message of satisfaction allows Bob to infer j, just as for
the trine. They then each compute the bit (1+ ǫjklm)/2.
Again they stay one step ahead of Eve as she listens to
the messages, as she can only narrow Alice’s signal down
to two possibilities. Given the order of Bob’s messages,
one of these corresponds to 0 and the other to 1, so Eve
is ignorant of the bit’s identity. Using the tetrahedron
allows Alice and Bob to establish one fully secret bit one
third of the time, analogous to the six-state protocol.
In the two protocols, the dual arrangement of signals
and measurements allows Alice and Bob to proceed by
elimination to establish a putative key. To ensure se-
curity of the protocols, however, the arrangement must
also disallow Eve from reading the signal without Alice
and Bob noticing. Analyzing the intercept/resend at-
tack provides evidence of how well the protocols based
3on spherical codes measure up to this task.
If Eve tampers with the signals in order to learn their
identity, the inevitable disturbance allows Alice and Bob
to infer how much Eve knows about the raw key. They
can then proceed to use error correction and privacy am-
plification procedures to distill a shorter key which, with
high probability, is identical for Alice and Bob and which
Eve has low probability of knowing anything about. In-
stead of delving into the details of error correction and
privacy amplification, we may instead use a lower bound
on the optimal rate of the distilled key, i.e., its length
as a fraction of the raw key. [5] This provides a reason-
able guess as to what may be achieved in practice and
is known to be achieveable using one-way communica-
tion. Given N →∞ samples from a tripartite distribu-
tion p(a, b, e), Alice and Bob can construct a protocol to
distill with high probability a length RN string about
which Eve has asymptotically zero information for
R = I(A :B) −min{I(A :E), I(B :E)}. (1)
Here the tripartite distribution refers to Alice’s and Bob’s
bit values a and b, and Eve’s best guess e from the eaves-
dropping. The quantity I(A :B) is the mutual informa-
tion between two parties, quantifying how much knowl-
edge of one’s outcome implies about the other’s.
Here we’re assuming that Eve simply intercepts a frac-
tion q of the signals, measures them, and sends a new
state on to Bob. The first task is then to determine R
as a function of q and then to relate q to the statistics
compiled in the course of the protocol. As it happens,
Eve’s best attack in the intercept/resend context is to use
both Alice’s and Bob’s trines for measurement, half the
time pretending to be Alice and the other half Bob. This
holds for the tetrahedron as well and is due to the min-
imum in Eq. (1), which gives the equation a symmetry
between Alice and Bob with respect to Eve. Choosing
only one of the trines (or tetrahedra) to measure breaks
this symmetry, leading the minimum to pick the smaller
information quantity and yield a consequently larger key.
By mixing the two strategies, Eve restores the symmetry
and increases the minimum knowledge she has about ei-
ther party’s bit string. Phoenix, et al. [4] note that the
scheme in which Eve pretends to be Bob maximizes her
mutual information with Alice; however, as the analysis
stops there and does not proceed to consider either Eve’s
information about the key bits nor any secret key rate
bounds, it is insufficient as a cryptographic analysis.
To determine the mutual information quantities as
functions of q, it suffices to consider first the case in which
Eve intercepts every signal and uses Alice’s ensemble for
measurement. With these quantities in hand, we can
mix Eve’s two measurement strategies appropriately and
then include her probability of interception. We begin
with the trine. Given a signal state from Alice, there
are two cases to consider. Either Eve measures and gets
the same state, which happens with probability 2/3, or
she obtains one of the other two results, with probabil-
ity 1/6 for each. Whatever her outcome, she passes the
corresponding state along to Bob and guesses that it was
the state sent by Alice, unless the subsequent exchange
of classical messages eliminates this possibility, at which
point she reserves judgement about the key bit.
Suppose Eve’s outcome corresponds to Alice’s signal,
and thus no disturbance is caused. Naturally, Alice and
Bob go on to establish a bit half the time, a bit known to
Eve. On the other hand, should her outcome not coincide
with Alice’s signal, there are two further possibilities.
Half the time Bob obtains a result consistent with Alice’s
signal, i.e. not the orthogonal state, and a further half the
time the sifting succeeds. However, the required sifiting
messages will eliminate Eve’s outcome as Alice’s signal,
thus forcing Eve to abandon her guess. In the remaining
case, Bob’s result is orthogonal to Alice’s signal, which
guarantees successful sifting, but also different bit values
for Alice and Bob. Half of Eve’s guesses are excluded
while the remainder agree with Bob’s.
Putting all this together, one obtains that the proto-
col fails with probability 5/12. All three agree one-third
of the time, and Alice’s bit is different from that shared
by Bob and Eve one-twelfth of the time. In the remain-
ing one-sixth of events, Eve does not field a guess, as
the messages exchanged by Alice and Bob contradict her
measurement results; better to abstain than to introduce
a purely random guess. In this subset of events, Alice
and Bob agree a further half the time.
Of the key bits created, Bob and Alice agree with prob-
ability 5/7, while Eve and Alice agree with probability
4/7. Eve only fields a guess with probability 5/7, and
always agrees with Bob when she does. These num-
bers are obtained by considering the raw probabilities
of agreement and renormalizing by 12/7. Should Eve in-
stead measure the signals using Bob’s trine ensemble, her
agreement probabilities with Alice and Bob are swapped.
Mixing the two strategies then yields Eve a no-guess
probability of 2/7, an agreement probability with either
party of 9/14, and an an error probability of 1/14.
To interpolate between the endpoints of no intercep-
tion and full interception, note that to condition on the
cases of successful bit creation, the probability of bit
agreement must be renormalized by the probability of
sifting success. This probability depends linearly on q:
psift = (6 + q)/12. All probabilities must therefore con-
tain 6 + q in the denominator, whence we may derive
pairwise probabilities that the parties’ bit values agree:
pab = (6− q)/(6+ q), and pae = 9q/2(6+ q), respectively.
Eve’s probability to not guess at all is 2(3− 2q)/(6 + q).
Determining the relevant mutual informations from these
expressions is straightforward; for expressions involving
Eve, simply treat the “no-guess” as another outcome
which has no correlation at all to the other party.
By determining the probability of error in Alice’s and
Bob’s bit strings as a function of q, we may compare to
other protocols. For the trine, errors occur in the key
string with probability 2q/(6 + q). Using the calculated
agreement probabilities in the rate bound, one obtains
that R = 0 corresponds to a maximum tolerable bit error
4rate of 20.4%. This compares favorably with the BB84
protocol’s maximum tolerable bit error rate of 17.1% un-
der the same attack [6]. In terms of channel error rate
these figures double, if we consider the quantum channel
to be a depolarizing channel instead of arising from Eve’s
interference. If Bob receives the maximally-mixed state
instead of Alice’s signal, the probability of error given
successful sifting is 1/2. Hence a fully depolarizing chan-
nel leads to a bit error rate of 50% for either protocol.
Analysis of the tetrahedron protocol proceeds similarly
by examining the various cases. In this case, when q = 1
the failure rate of the protocol drops to 5/9, while Alice
and Bob agree with probability 5/8, Eve has probability
7/16 of knowing Alice’s or Bob’s bit value, and she re-
serves judgement half the time. As the successful sifting
rate of the protocol goes like (3+q)/9, we may determine
the form of the probabilities using the same method to
be pab = peb = (6 − q)/2(3 + q) and pae = 7q/4(3 + q),
while the error rate in the key string is 3q/2(3 + q) and
Eve’s probability of not guessing is (3−q)/(3+q). Using
these probabilities in the rate bound yields a maximum
error rate of 26.7%. Like before, this compares favor-
ably to the maximum tolerable error rate in the six-state
protocol of 22.7%.
Eve’s attack could be gentler, however. In the version
already considered, her POVM consists of subnormalized
projectors onto the code states in addition to an element
proportional to the identity operator, corresponding to
the case in which Eve opts not to intercept the signal. A
similar POVM can be created by distributing a piece of
identity operator to all the other elements. The crucial
difference is that the state Eve sends on to Bob after her
measurement is different. Using the square root of each
POVM element in the formula for the post-measurement
state, the resulting measurement yields Eve more infor-
mation for the same amount of disturbance. Note that
in the context of the BB84 protocol, this attack was de-
termined to be optimal when Eve does not wait to hear
in which basis the signal was prepared [7].
Enlisting the aid of Mathematica to carry out the
bookkeeping yields the following results. Since the attack
is stronger, the maximum tolerable error decreases; in
particular the trine can create secret keys up to a 16.6%
bit error rate, as opposed to 15.3% for its cousin BB84.
The tetrahedron remains the most robust, sustaining key
creation up to a maximum error rate of 22.6%, as com-
pared to 21.0% for the six-state protocol.
Framing the key rate in terms of the error rate is solely
for ease of comparison, as it is not necessary for Alice and
Bob to sacrifice key bits in order to obtain an estimate of
q when using spherical codes, in contrast to the situation
for the unbiased bases. For spherical codes, the sifting
rate of the protocol itself determines q; as the channel
becomes noisier and Bob’s outcome less correlated with
Alice’s signal, the sifting rate increases. Of course, not
all of this increase provides useful key: most of it leads
to errors. But Eve cannot substitute signals solely for
the purpose of modifying the sift rate, as her signals will
be uncorrelated with Alice’s and will therefore also lead
to an increase in the sift rate. Hence she is precluded
from masking her interceptions, and Alice and Bob can
determine q from the sifting rate itself.
Finally, a word on the feasibility of implementing such
protocols. Generation of trine or tetrahedral codewords
as polarization states of (near) single-photon sources is
not difficult. The generalized measurements accompa-
nying the ensembles can be performed by using polariz-
ing beam splitters and wave plates to map polarization
states into different propagation modes and proceeding
from there with linear optical elements to produce the ap-
propriate interference. Such measurements have indeed
been performed with rms errors in observed statistical
distributions of a few percent [8]. The physical imple-
mentation needn’t be identical to the logical construction
of the protocol, however. For instance, three states con-
structed from two pairs of singlets together with ordinary
photodectors can implement the trine protocol [9].
Two advantages of using spherical codes have been es-
tablished herein. First and foremost is the strong possi-
bility of improved eavesdropping resistance. Subsequent
analyses either of stronger attacks, such as use of an
asymmetric cloning machine [10], or the use of error-
correcting codes to beat back noise [11] are required to
demonstrate this fact in the setting of unconditional se-
curity, though the intercept/resend attacks are indicative
of the trend [12]. Beyond security is the ability to directly
estimate the error rate from the sift rate itself, obviating
any need to sacrifice raw key bits.
The author acknowledges helpful input from
D. Bruß, C. M. Caves, J. Eisert, D. Gottesman,
and N. Lu¨tkenhaus. This work was supported in part by
Office of Naval Research Grant No. N00014-00-1-0578.
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of the
IEEE International Conference on Computers, Systems,
and Signal Processing (IEEE, New York, 1984), p. 175.
[2] D. Bruß, Phys. Rev. Lett. 81, 3018 (1998).
[3] J. M. Renes, quant-ph/0311106.
[4] S. J. D. Phoenix, S. M. Barnett, and A. Chefles, J. Mod.
Opt. 47, 507 (2000).
[5] I. Csisza´r and J. Ko¨rner, IEEE Trans. Inf. Theory IT-24,
339 (1978).
[6] A. Ekert and B. Huttner, J. Mod. Opt. 41, 2455 (1994).
[7] N. Lu¨tkenhaus, Phys. Rev. A 54, 97 (1996).
[8] R. B. M. Clarke, et al., Phys. Rev. A 64 012303 (2001).
[9] J.-C. Boileau, et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 92 17901 (2004).
[10] N. J. Cerf, J. Mod. Opt. 47, 187 (2000).
[11] P. W. Shor and J. Preskill, Phys. Rev. Lett. 85, 441
(2000).
[12] C. A. Fuchs et al., Phys. Rev. A 56, 1163 (1997).
